The Flight P Convoy Disaster – the largest loss of Landing Craft [Tanks] before D-Day
The Flight P Convoy Disaster – the
largest loss of LCTs before D-Day
The Convoy Departs
On 5th November 1943 the corvette, HMS Bluebell [1], the trawler ‘Man of War’ [2] and tug ‘Empire Rupert' [3] left Gibraltar. Their objective was to escort twenty-five Landing Craft [Tank] and one Landing Craft [Gun] to Milford Haven. Ten days later only one of those craft would have arrived undamaged and then not in Wales, but Cornwall. 20% of the LCTs would have been lost. It was the single largest loss of landing craft to that point – and would only be outdone by D-Day itself.
The story of the Flight P Convoy is the story of the where the abundance of the Allies would meet the overstretch of commitments in the late 1943. The extension of the Allied War effort to the invasion of Sicily and then Italy itself had drawn resources to the Mediterranean – where many of the members of Flight P had been transferred in April of that year. Now they were needed back in Britain ahead of D-Day. So far, the weather had been reasonable and longer nights would help shield the ships from prying German eyes however it was only a matter of time before the autumn gales began to roll in from the Atlantic. Early November was leaving it quite late.
The Landing Craft [Tank] began its evolution in the year Britain was under invasion threat. In 1940 20 Mark 1s were completed. The modified Mark 2 appeared the following year and was in short order dropped for the substantially lengthened Mark 3. Further developments were made but the bulk of the Flight P craft were Mark 3s. As a group, they had the capacity to put a brigade of tanks on a beach in a single operation. The Mark 4 and 5 had been developed by November 1943. One of the improvements in the Mark 4 was having 70-ton bilge pumps, not 20. Something the Mark 3s of the convoy would sadly miss.
In the vast Royal Navy of 1943, LCTs were a long way down in the hierarchy of consideration. Under the command of a lowly war-time commissioned Royal Navy Volunteer Reserve Lieutenant, they were somewhere towards the bottom of the pecking order when it came to resource allocation. It didn’t help that their main function was to be run aground – with the shock that entailed to the structure of the vessel which, amongst other things, had caused leakages in the ballast tanks. Hopes of remedial repairs before their long journey were not fully met. Augusta, on Sicily, had been used as a maintenance base but was lacking the facilities to cope with the demands of all the LCTs. Some spares had been taken from other ships but, in some cases, they made things worse. As Lieutenant Watts, first lieutenant of LCT 306, later claimed his vessel had gone in to have a bent propellor and port rudder replaced instead they had their newish shaft taken and the bent one left. [4]
Intended Destination of Flight P Convoy from Gibraltar to Milford Haven
Taken from Google Maps
When Flight P left Gibraltar, they had: few spares, inadequate spars to hold up the (often elderly) canvas covering the holds and, as comparatively elderly craft, not a few mechanical issues. [5]
The commodore of the convoy was from the Australian Navy,
Lieutenant Commander C.R. Masterman [6].
His report, at the subsequent inquiry, stated they left in good weather,
passing Europa Point at 2pm on the 5th. Masterman described conditions till the 12th as amounting to ‘almost flat calm.’, He
sailed on LCT 324.
Early on in the journey, mechanical failures, which were to
be such a feature of the subsequent events, occurred. On the afternoon of the 6th, LCT
421 had to turn back to Gibraltar when an engine broke down. The convoy continued but the increasing
number of temporary breakdowns saw as many as six LCTs with engine problems
each day. [7] The tug kept busy with either it, the escorts
or even other LCTs required to tow the stricken.
LCT 306 was plagued by problems. At 12.15 on the 8th November LCT 306 lost its starboard engine. At midday on 11th its port propeller shaft then snapped and it was being towed by LCT 422. Towing was not something the crews necessarily looked forward to or had had much training. Lieutenant Roche, commander of the 306 was later asked if he had used a towing slip before and ruefully replied, ‘yes, but without great success’.
Interference from Axis forces was limited. When level with the north-west tip of Spain a
Focke-Wulf Fw 200 Condor was spotted [13.53, 9th November] in very
poor visibility. It circled the convoy once and headed off in a south westerly
direction.
A Change in the weather - 11th November
The Monthly Weather Report of the Meteorological Office for 1943 stated that November was ‘Dry on the whole; mild then rather cold.’. It rather innocently noted ‘On the 11th a depression off south-east Iceland moved rapidly east-south-east and on the 12th another disturbance moved south-east from Iceland; rain or showers occurred and there were rather widespread gales in the west and north on the 12th.' [p.141] Gales were hardly unknown at this time of year however while Pendennis Castle had recorded only 31 hours of gusts above 38 mph across the whole of October and a mere six that November. [8]
Early on the 11th the convoy experienced a northerly
wind, which turned into a force five [fresh breeze] from the north-west by
evening. The sea began to pound the LCTs,
causing leaks which stretched some of the pumps to their capacity. The
wind slowed progress. The commander of LCG [L] 1, for example, had been
proceeding at a steady 7¼ knots – running its engine at half ahead. He was now
reduced to 4¾ knots. He was fortunate as other vessels made little or no
progress.
Order across the convoy was breaking down. LCT 422 was unable to continue towing 306 and 390 had to take over. Increasingly LCTs were losing their tows and, in some cases, the line was lost completely. By that afternoon LCT 311 broke down and with the tug already busy with LCT 306. By evening it was clear that things were not going well and Masterman requested of C in C Plymouth that he could aim for the nearer by and more sheltered Falmouth, which mean running south-eastwards, with the north-westerly winds behind them. His wish was granted.
12th November – Gale Force Winds
Daylight [9] on the 12th revealed the convoy had
begun to separate. Man o’ War relieved
390 of the strain of towing 306 to prevent the LCT breaking down but these
ships were now six miles behind the rest of the Flight. Order was restored but the convoy went into
the night with a west by north-west wind which had reached force 8 [gale]. LCT 418, like others, saw her canvas covers split
and the spreaders holding it up collapse.
At which point her pump failed.
Bluebell arrived, maintained a close escort until 22.00, when she had to
depart to deal with another emergency.
13th November – Before Dawn: The loss of the 343
Canvas had been stretched over the decks of the LCTs to
prevent flooding. This had been what was
available and, what was to hand, was often 18 months old and as tired as the craft.
At 00.30 LCT 343 shipped a lot of water. This split its canvass cover and put
the vessel in peril. Despite the failure of one pump, the other, aided by hand
bailers worked hard and things seemed to be under control until another wave,
at 02.30, collapsed the hatches and the starboard engine failed. She was now beam onto the sea and taking on
water. Lieutenant ACV Prince, commander
of the 343 decided to abandon ship and put up Red Verey lights. [10]
Bluebell dashed off to lend aid and dropped two Carley floats. [11] During the evacuation one of the floats capsized several times, throwing the crew into the sea. Stoker 1st Class Joseph Neary grabbed hold of the rope rather than the Carley float and through exhaustion, lost his grip and was washed away. His loss was not noted till the rest of the crew had got onboard. He was one of the two deaths during the mission. [12]
The skipper of 343, having decided all was done for, opened the sea cocks of his craft and by 23.35 all the crew were aboard Bluebell. The corvette then spent some time recovering the floats as it was thought they would probably be needed again. The problem was the 343 hadn’t actually gone down and anxious to return to the 418 the Bluebell fired three depth charges at the craft to finish the job. One actually landed in the hold of the 343 but didn’t go off. A fourth managed to get underneath the engine room and achieved its goal.
13th November - daylight
The 13th dawned without much improvement. Despite bright moonlight, the winds and the
need to conduct a large turn towards Falmouth resulted in the convoy splitting
into two groups. Bluebell, Man o’ War ,
Empire Rupert and 13 landing craft formed one – scattered – section. The
remaining 12 landing craft were some six miles to the north. The sea conditions made it difficult for
vessels to see each other. Bluebell
hoisted a large flag to make it visible and sent out radio orders for all ships
to close on her. Matters were not helped
by the fact that radio transmissions by the LCTs were very poor, with only LCT 399
able to both send and receive. [13]
The convoy began to separate further. At one point the commander was left in a group of 5 LCTs and the LCG with neither escort in sight. At 10.00 LCT 332 was last seen by the rest of the convoy. She had been running on one engine and falling behind. At this point there was no escort vessel to go in search of her. Her story can be found here /the-spanish-odyssey-of-lct-332-flight
Last seen location of LCT 322
If not relief, at least help was at hand. HMS Grassholm, a trawler, [14] and the tug,
HMS Dextrous [15], were spotted three miles from the convoy at 11.45. Dextrous immediately relieved Man O’ War of
towing duties, the latter’s line to LCT 306 having recently broken.
At much the same time LCT 333’s port engine packed in. Lieutenant Porteous signaled to all the
escorts and the vessel laboured on till midday when a heavy sea smashed the
stanchions supporting the canvas, splitting it. The tank deck filled with water. Dexterous arrived and after two attempts a
tow line was established at 16.00.
The winds continued to increase. Lieutenant Commander Cazaly RNVR – Vice Commodore of the convoy, sailing on LCT 324 – noted the windspeed was now 80mph. Cazaly would later remark that, if the whole convoy could have kept a speed of 8 knots they would have run ahead of the gale and no one would have been lost. It was not to be.
Skipper Lieutenant Tavendale’s problems increased through
the day. Apart from having lost his canvass, the water had shifted the cargo on
LCT418 and a box of reserved coal had spilled and blocked the pumps. Orders, imperfectly relayed, had instructed no
loose cargos should be in the hold because of this problem however the build up
of mud and other detritus were cited as exacerbating this problem. Although
some of the obstruction was cleared and the crew were bailing, he decided to
hove to and didn’t make much progress over the next three days.
At 16.20 LCG [L] 1 – the only vessel which would escape without damage – lost one of its crew. Marine John Marples and two hands were sheltering on the starboard side of the bridge when an exceptionally heavy sea struck the vessel and enveloped the superstructure. All three were thrown against the railings, but Marples failed to hang on and was drowned. [16]
The weather continued to worsen, causing more engine
seizures. In his subsequent report Masterman stated he believed, as nightfall,
he could keep the Flight together, saving those broken-down craft which were
attended by the tugs and trawlers.
Bluebell was ordered to burn a bright white light so it could act as a
rallying point.
Masterman’s optimism was about to be tested. At 17.30 LCT418, now four miles astern, sent
up distress flares. Bluebell was sent at
full speed to investigate. 418’s hatch cover had stove in and, in the
rough seas, was shipping a huge amount of water. Her pump had failed but, at
the time, she was not in immediate danger of foundering, but Bluebell was asked
to standby.
Meanwhile LCT 385 was also in serious difficulties. Beam on to the sea and wind, with her engine room, messdeck and tank space flooded and pumps disabled, she requested help from Man O War – which closed and attempted to fix a line. Three attempts failed, part of the problem was the danger of keeping men on 385’s foredeck. Lieutenant Coles, commander of the Man O War, considered getting Carley floats to evacuate the LCT but considered it so dangerous in the darkness he persuaded her skipper to stay onboard till daylight. Coles continued to shepherd 385 for three hours till, at 21.05, with the wind now at force 9, the game was up.
Man O War went alongside to affect a rescue. The first attempt saw two men leap to safety. The ships fell apart but a second attempt saw another 14 taken onboard. It took two last tries to get the last two men aboard. The rescue had taken almost an hour. In a neatly typed report, written on 16th November, LCT 385’s commander, Lieutenant Hogg, assured the Flag Officer, Falmouth, that his first lieutenant has disposed of the recognition signals and other important documents before the vessel was abandoned. He also praised his officers and crew for performing ‘..their duties in a most creditable manner.’.
14th November 1943
At 02.30 LCT385 turned over and sank.
LCT333 had struggled on through the night. Her pumps were unable to deal with the
increasing amount of water on board. At
04.00 the increased weight of the vessel caused the tow to part. Although her
starboard engine worked, her port was giving out great clouds of smoke. Her commander, Lieutenant Porteous attempted
to continue but was unable to make headway.
When the bilge pump failed and with the 1st lieutenant
estimated 750-800 tons of water in the hold, it was clearly time to abandon
ship.
The Dextrous came up and lowered a boat – crewed by an Engineering Officers [17] and the Boatswain at 05.30. Porteous had oil poured on the sea to calm the waves and make the evacuation easier. He dismantled the craft’s gun, threw the parts into the sea and then got aboard the rescue boat. Two hours later the boat returned to Dextrous. The 333 was left to sink.
Elsewhere some craft lay hove to and others struggled to
stay afloat. LCT 306 was beam on to winds of up to force 11. The sea was entering the bridge and the well. The
well deck canvas and stretchers were carried away by the gale, taking the
Carley floats with them.
LCT 418 had struggled on through the night. Her Skipper, Lieutenant Alexander Ord
Tavendale was a rare bird in the convoy, he was RNR and not RNVR [18]. Bluebell
sprinted in search of it at a heady 13 knots, zigzagging and sending out morse
messages as well as burning a bright white light. Tavendale attempted to make a sea anchor but
could not make one large enough. The fitting of sea anchors would be
recommendation of the later Inquiry.
Morning brought the Bluebell close to LCT 317 and 345. 317 reported that all was well and they were
making course for Falmouth.
15th November 1943
The Convoy was now scattered to the winds. Some had made for the Scilly Isles, some laboured on towards Falmouth and one went to Penzance. At 10.05 15th November Man O War arrived in Falmouth. Ten minutes later, the still wallowing forward LCT 317 spotted a Sunderland Flying Boat. Attempts were made to signal to it and a destroyer and tug came out to escort them home.
Fixing a position had proved difficult. Bluebell had managed to get a fix at midday on 14th. Dexterous hadn’t until 8.00 on 15th. They were 20 miles further south than expected and considered dangerously close to the French coast. Turning towards Britain, an appeal was made for protection and four Spitfires arrived at 10.40. These were later replaced by four typhoons however no enemy craft attempted to interfere. Dexterous arrived off the Lizard at 23.30 and Falmouth at 3.00 on the 16th.
16th November – the final loss
LCT 418 was still limping towards harbour but her time was up. A Liberator had spotted them and had been able to make contact. By the afternoon her hold was full and all efforts to stop the water were proving futile. Water now got into the fuel and the engines gave up. At 19.15 HMS Talybont [19] lowered a Carley float with line attached and all the crew were brought off in two trips.
The tail end
LCT324 was in a bad state.
Her port engine had failed, its cam shaft broken. The connecting rod on
the starboard engine was reduced to ten cylinders when a connecting rod broke. It was making about ½ knot. HMS Marauder, a rescue tug out of Falmouth
arrived to take it in tow. At 9.00 on 18th November LCT 306 arrived
Falmouth doing 2-3 knots.
The Fate of the Flight P Convoy
Falmouth: LCG [L] 1, LCT 302, 305,306, 311, 317, 324,341,
345, 382, 384, 390, 411, 442.
Penzance, some damage - LCT 313
Scilly Isles: LCT 318, 320, 354,399, 413 – unable to proceed
because of heavy weather damage.
Wrecked on Spanish Coast – LCT 332
Sunk – LCT 333, 345, 385, 418. [21]
LCT 320, 318, 399 and 413 on Porth Mellon beach, St Mary's Isles of Scilly [21]
It is worth noting only one of these vessels was described
as ‘undamaged’ – LCG [L] 1 and four of those in Falmouth were ‘disabled and in
tow.’
A Board of Inquiry was appointed on the 17th and
held on 22nd November 1943 to investigate the causes and lessons to
be learnt from the Flight P Convoy affair.
The Board examined the testimony of 22 witnesses, including the
Commander and 1st Lieutenant of LCT 418 – who had ended up in
Plymouth after their vessel sunk. Some
of the evidence was typed, some was written, and one, on the note paper of the
Falmouth Hotel. [20] Not least among the
questions were what had happened to LCT 332 – whose fate was still unknown.
The officers and men of the convoy were exonerated of any
blame and praised, as they lived ‘..up to the highest naval traditions of
conduct and seamanlike qualities throughout the period during which many of
them were faced with grave danger through stress of weather.’,
It was observed ‘the hold of an LCT, when flooded, is like
a large bath and if the water cannot get away quickly the craft is likely to
become unmanageable and founder.’. Only the
LCG had a steel deck – and was the only undamaged craft, although it had had
mechanical problems. It is worth noting
that three LCIs [Landing Craft Infantry], which sailed at the same time, but
separate from the convoy, all arrived safely. Each were totally enclosed.
It could have been worse. The Inquiry noted ‘It is important to note that during practically the whole time that Flight ‘P’ was exposed to a N.Wly gale, their course was to the South of East, so that the wind was on the quarter…… Had the gale which Flight ‘P’ encountered blown from the N.E. instead of the N.W., the losses would have been very much heavier, and it is in fact doubtful whether any vessel could have survived unless she had abandoned the attempt to reach the UK and turned to run before the gale.’.
This was not the end of it. The Inquiry’s findings were passed along to HMS Dinosaur – the tank landing craft HQ in Troon – on 5th May 1944: a further missive was sent to the Admiralty. On board LCT 324 had been Lieutenant Commander Musa Cazaly RNVR. Cazaly felt that the ‘comparative dryness’ of that craft had been due to the fact it was less heavily ballasted than the others. This was, obviously, a key point for him and one he felt had not been brought out in the Inquiry. [22]
In the end, the story of the Flight P Convoy is one of
overstretch. Had the Allies not extended their Mediterranean commitments in the
summer of 1943, they may have been able to sail ahead of the autumn gales. The engines of an LCT required maintenance
every 300 hours and replacement after 1000.
Although they had been given some attention on Scilly, most had been
running for 2-3000 hours. At the bottom
of a very long food chain, the LCTs were not given the materials to construct
and maintain proper hold covers. None of
these things individually meant the Flight P disaster would happen in November
1943, but each increased the chances of it happening sometime in the autumn and
winter before D-Day.
Footnotes / Rabbit Holes
[1] HMS Bluebell was a Flower-Class corvette, ordered on the very eve of war and begun service with the Atlantic Convoys in August 1940. She had been moved to Gibraltar Convoys in April 1941 before a refit and duty on the Arctic route. She had spent most 1943 in the Western Approaches, with a midsummer deployment to the Med to support Operation Huskey. It appears Bluebell was detached from either convoy MKS 028G or SL138MK [bound from Gibraltar to the United Kingdom] to lead the Flight P convoy.
HMS Bluebell,
Imperial War Museum Collection https://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/205120217
http://www.naval-history.net/xGM-Chrono-20Cor-Flower-Bluebell.htm
Her commander was Lieutenant Geoffrey Herbert Walker, was the son of Norman Duguid and Ada Walker of Ryton on Tyne, County Durham, was born in 1915. He went to Trinity College, Cambridge.
In 1939 his family were living in Ryton Grove Cottage. Norman was a solicitor, as was his eldest son Robert. It as family tradition, Norman's father than worked in the Law. The oldest sibling, Margaret, was described as a Graduate Certificated School Teacher. A younger brother was still at school. Apart from a female domestic servant and an undergardener, the Rickletons did for them as a live-in couple. Frederick tended the garden, Olive was a domestic. The Rickletons had a year old daughter.
He died when HMS Bluebell was sunk on 17th February 1945, while guarding one of the Russian Convoys. There was only one survivor.
[2] HMT Man o’ War had been built in Selby by Cochrane shipbuilders in 1937. It was taken over by the Admiralty in August 1939 and seen convoy service in the Atlantic. https://uboat.net/allies/warships/ship/6418.html
A photo of four
members of HMT Man o’ War’s football team can be seen below. Imperial War Museum Collection.
https://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/205119481
[3] SS Empire Rupert had been built in Goole in 1943/. It had a crew of 10 and was capable of 9 knots.
https://www.wrecksite.eu/wreck.aspx?11924
[4] National Archive ADM 1/15024. Most of the references for this article, unless otherwise stated, come from the Inquiry into the Flight P Disaster. The collection include the final report, the minutes of the Inquiry and written statements from those involved.
[5] Lieutenant Porteous, commander of LCT 333, reported at the subsequent inquiry, that he had had to keep the bilge pump going since they left Gibraltar. A further issue may have been poor quality fuel. During the Inquiry Lieutenant Butcher RM, aboard the LCG 1, stated that when they had taken on fuel at Bizerte [Tunisia] they were warned it may have been contaminated. He suggested that the storms stirred this up, causing subsequent engine problems.
The convoy’s Engineering Officer, Lieutenant Bowler, said that he had been with eight of the LCTs since March. He felt they all had required docking and had no replacement spare parts in the last seven months.
[6] Masterman was onboard LCT 399. He pops up in the online records now and again. The Maryborough Chronicle [6th September 1940] reports he had passed his exams and been appointed a Sub-lieutenant. He was awaiting transfer to England to serve on motor torpedo boats. Masterman later served as a flotilla officer for the 4th LCT flotilla at Dieppe. On 11th May 1944 Masterman joined HMAS Assault – a training centre on Nelson Bay, New South Wales. Previously he had been on the books of the shore establishment, HMAS Penguin [Sydney Harbour]
[7] Masterman later reported a single engine failure on the 5th, 6 on the 7th, 6 on the 9th, 3 on the 10th, 3 on the 11th and 6 on the 12th.
[8] The Met Office Report for 1943 can be found here https://digital.nmla.metoffice.gov.uk/IO_b04803dc-ee07-4a9b-826b-d394fa685ef4/
The Met Office annual reports from 1941 to 1943 – but not before – carry a summary of number of hours of gale force winds at different weather stations. Pendennis, the eventual destination of the convoy had been relatively peaceful in November 1942 and 43.
|
Pendennis |
Jan |
Feb |
March |
April |
May |
June |
July |
Aug |
Sept |
Oct |
Nov |
Dec |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1943 |
139 |
108 |
50 |
48 |
80 |
33 |
9 |
11 |
1 |
31 |
6 |
10 |
|
1942 |
124 |
12 |
16 |
191 |
101 |
2 |
5 |
15 |
13 |
33 |
3 |
148 |
|
1941 |
66 |
123 |
123 |
44 |
16 |
0 |
0 |
61 |
2 |
60 |
123 |
60 |
This was the case at its original route to St Ann’s Head – near to Milford Haven – had been relatively calm in November 1942.
|
St Ann's Head |
Jan |
Feb |
March |
April |
May |
June |
July |
Aug |
Sept |
Oct |
Nov |
Dec |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1943 |
271 |
252 |
63 |
104 |
96 |
34 |
46 |
133 |
63 |
128 |
217 |
114 |
|
1942 |
279 |
44 |
78 |
224 |
123 |
15 |
77 |
70 |
135 |
165 |
23 |
258 |
|
1941 |
77 |
152 |
100 |
23 |
21 |
6 |
17 |
131 |
9 |
180 |
241 |
221 |
Unfortunately, the windspeed on the Lizard cannot be ascertained as, the report declares the anemometer was under repair. In an attempt to place November 1943 in context I did look at the 1944 records, only to find the records for Pendennis marked as defective and they still hadn’t fixed the Lizard till March.
[9] Nautical Twilight would begin at approximately 07.45 BST. Britain was currently using Double Summertime. It would an hour earlier GMT.
[10] Despite my well advertised dyslexia, the original report spells them Verey and not Very lights. What Edward Wilson Very would think of this is difficult to know as the inventor of this flare gun died in 1910.
[11] Carley Floats also had an American inventor, Horace Carley. They may be seen here https://navyhistory.au/carley-life-rafts-of-ww2/
[12] Joseph Neary was born on 5th August 1922, in North Ormsby.
[13] In the subsequent inquiry Lieutenant Walker, Commanding the Bluebell, said he had expected radio difficulties but not total failure. Signaling was problematic, with the LCTs often being under the crest of a wave and flags being only visible at a mile. He felt the only way to communicate was to be physically close to the LCT.
[14] HMS Grassholm was a mine sweeper trawler,
launched in April 1943 and commanded by John Anton Antonsen RNR. https://uboat.net/allies/warships/ship/6688.html
Photos of HMS Grassholm. https://www.skipet.no/skip/krigsbygd/eskortetralere/hms-grassholm
[15] HMS Dexterous was an Assurance class Rescue tug. She had been built in Selby by Cochrane and Sons and launched in April 1942. She was put in Dutch hands in March 1943 and sailed with an Anglo-Dutch crew but a skipper from the Netherlands. At this time the captain had been temporarily replaced by B.C. Weltevrede.
https://www.worldnavalships.com/forums/thread.php?threadid=6910
Photo of HMS Dexterous https://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/object/205120865
[16] The Inquiry sought the reasons the men were on the deck when they had no need to be. They were out of sight of the officer of the watch, Lieutenant Butcher RM who had not given them permission to be there. It was suggested that, as the main galley was out of action, they may have been going to the after galley but the evidence was neither conclusive nor followed up.
John Marples
was born on 13th September 1924 in Manchester. In 1939 he was a capstan lathe
worker. He joined the Royal Marines.
Every year until at least 1958 his birthday was honoured in the
Manchester Evening News.
[17] Second Engineer JJ Enemuga, Third Engineer A Roeleveld and Boatswain L Ras – all volunteers.
[18] The Royal Naval Reserve was the domain of merchant sailors who had joined the Royal Navy for the war. Alexander was born in Aberdeen on 22nd April 1900. On his 18th birthday he left off being an oil cake worker and joined the Royal Navy. At the time he was described as being 5 foot 3, 34 inch chest, black haired, blue eyed and sallow of complexion. He was sent to train on HMS Powerful as a ‘Boy’ and left to join the light cruiser HMS Caroline as an Ordinary Seaman.
After the war Tavendale joined the merchant navy. On 14th May 1941 he had re-entered the Royal Navy as a Temporary Skipper, the rank often given to trawlermen. The 1944 Navy lists saw him recorded as Temporary Acting Skipper Lieutenant as of 7th July 1943
The Scotsman [and Aberdeen papers] reported, on 24th May 1944, that, as an Acting temporary skipper lieutenant, Tavendale had been awarded the Distinguished Service Cross in 1944. The award was for bravery while commanding a landing craft at Salerno. The weekly Journal [Aberdeen] announced, on 21st December 1944 that the medal had been awarded by the king. Tavendale was described as being from 59 Morningside Avenue, Aberdeen.
[19] HMS Talybont was a Type III Hunter class destroyer launched in 1943.
[20] 477 questions were asked and typed up. Most witnesses were the commanding officers but other ranks, such as Able Seamen Herrin and Blessington were called upon. Some witnesses, such as Lieutenant Prince of the Bluebell, were called back to give testimony a second time.
[21] LCT 318 stayed on the Scillys for two weeks. On Spring Tides she was refloated and made her way to Swansea for repairs. Further details of her war time service can be found at this excellent site https://www.combinedops.com/HMLCT%20318.htm
[22] The Report
included examples of the loss of LCT 403 – 24/2/43 and LCT 547 – 8/7/43, which
were both put down to excessive water in the ballast tanks.
Musa
Cazaly was born on 6th June 1903 in Torquay and died in Surrey
in 1985. He was the son of Alfred Cazaly and Rose Hortense
Howes. Rose was the daughter of a Baptist Minister from Bethnal
Green, who was at the time of her birth, 47 and living with his 26 year old
wife Annie Maria and their five children, in Battle.
Alfred Cazaly
was born in Camberwell. His father may have been a warehouse clerk,
his mother was a music teacher who took in lodgers. By 1891 his
father, Thomas, had died and the family were ‘living on their own
means.’ In 1911 Alfred was a lecturer in Plymouth, working for the
Anti-Socialist Union. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anti-Socialist_Union
In the 1911
census Musa was living in Durlston Road, Kingston-upon-Thames, with his mother
and four siblings. Sister Ethel [1900] was born in St Leonards,
Percy [1902] in Forest Gate, Musa and Ida [1905] in Torquay and Irene [1910] in
Norbition. Rose had moved back to Devon after the First World
War. Musa married Marian Darnbrook, of Sandhills Farm, Thorner, in
1931. His father, Alfred, died aged 40 that year.
At what point
Musa had joined the Thames Police is unclear. In 1936 he appeared in
West London Observer [12th June 1936]. Sergeant
Cazaly had been on duty in a police motor-boat when he discovered a body, that
of William Leadbetter, near Wandsworth Bridge.
Musa joined the
Navy and appeared in the Navy Lists as a Temporary Lieutenant on 18th March
1942. The 1943 list marked him as Acting Lieutenant
Commander. The Royal Museums Greenwich have many documents he
was responsible for https://www.rmg.co.uk/collections/archive/rmgc-object-475437
He had
commanded the 11th LCT Flotilla during Husky and
Neptune. On D-Day he had landed the Canadian Armoured Regiment [Fort
Garry Horse] DD Shermans on Nan Sector of Juno beach. It was his
decision, given the roughness of the sea, to take the tanks right onto the
beach rather than making them swim from a distance.
Post War Cazaly worked with what would once have been described as ‘troubled boys.’ He appeared in the Daily Herald [10th February 1953] in an article which focused on attempts to intervene with young offenders at an early stage to prevent future trouble.
In 1983, when listed in the Gazette as an Instructor at the Central London Junior Boys attendance centre, he was awarded the OBE. He died in 1984.
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